Forensic psychology is a burgeoning fi eld in the social and behavioral sciences. It explores the application of the science and the profession of psychology, including questions and issues relating to the law and legal systems. Research and practice in forensic psychology have been approached from a broad range of theoretical perspectives, from psychoanalytic to behavioral-genetic. It also has explored a issues ranging from the criminal mind to the origins of rules that govern the structure of societies. Despite these achievements, however, differences in theoretical perspectives in forensic psychology have led to an often splintered and incomplete treatment of the fi eld.
characteristics contributing to better problem solving, the genes that contributed to the development of those characteristics were passed on in greater numbers than the genes coding for less successful characteristics. A benefi cial characteristic providing even a 1% advantage in reproduction (fi tness advantage) over other, less benefi cial characteristics could completely replace the poorer characteristics in a few thousand generations (Nilsson & Pelger, 1994) . Over the millions of generations of human evolutionary history, characteristics that helped individuals to solve recurrent problems that affected their fi tness were gradually sculpted into functional adaptations by the process of natural selection.
Evolutionary processes undoubtedly shaped physiological characteristics to help solve problems of survival and reproduction. The skin is well adapted to protecting the vital organs beneath from injury and infection. The lungs, with their vast surface area and moist membranes, are marvelous adaptations for extracting oxygen and releasing carbon dioxide. The heart is a powerful pump that functions to circulate oxygen and other nutrients to cells throughout our bodies. Just as selection shaped physiological adaptations with specifi c problem-solving functions, it also shaped the structure of thoughts, preferences, desires, attitudes, and emotions to guide behaviors toward solving historically recurrent problems that affected reproductive fi tness. The adaptationist approach used by evolutionary psychologists uses knowledge of recurrent ancestral problems to generate hypotheses about the functions and forms of cognitive mechanisms in human minds.
Humans do not have specialized horns for fi ghting rivals or teeth for incapacitating prey. Instead, our minds house a large complement of specialized cognitive adaptations that coordinate patterns of behavior capable of solving such problems. Tooby and DeVore (1987) argue that humans occupy the "cognitive niche" in earth's ecosystems. They propose that our place in this unique niche is largely the result of the importance of social interaction over the course of human evolutionary history. Interacting with others can facilitate fi nding solutions to adaptive problems. However, sociality can also create unique sources of confl ict. There would have been significant selection pressure over human evolutionary history in favor of strategies that coordinate cooperation with others in contexts where working together was more benefi cial than going it alone (Trivers, 1971) , such as hunting large game, building shelter, and defending against attacks from rival groups. There also would have been signifi cant selection pressure for the evolution of strategies to best others in contexts of confl ict over scarce resources (Buss & Shackelford, 1997a) , including competition for attractive mates and territories.
One general strategy for winning contests over limited resources is infl icting costs on rivals. Damaging rivals in competition for resources makes the net benefi t of controlling the resources lower for them. Infl icting enough damage can make the costs of competition for a scarce resource exceed the benefi ts of controlling the resource, at which point the most adaptive strategy is to disengage from competition, leaving the resource to the cost-infl icting individual. The potential benefi ts of cost-infl icting strategies in contexts of competition for resources would have created selection pressure for the purposeful infl iction of costs as a strategy to outcompete rivals. A special set of adaptations may have evolved for this purpose in psychopaths (see Chapter 10 of this volume).
Several sources of confl ict between individuals have been recurrent over human evolutionary history. Understanding the nature of recurrent confl icts between individuals in our evolutionary past can give us insight into the form and function of manifest confl icts between people today. In what follows, we explore some of the most important sources of confl ict for our ancestors and briefl y discuss their implications for the fi eld of evolutionary forensic psychology.
Interindividual Confl ict

Confl ict over Status
One broad context of confl ict between individuals is the struggle for status. All available evidence indicates that men who are high in status have sexual access to a greater number of women than do men who are low in status (Betzig, 1993; Buss, 2003a; Hill & Hurtado, 1996; Perusse, 1993) . Men who are high in status also are more likely than their low-status rivals to seek out younger and more fertile women (Grammer, 1992) and to marry women who are more attractive (Taylor & Glenn, 1976; Udry & Eckland, 1984) . An individual in a group cannot ascend a status hierarchy without displacing someone above, bumping that person to a lower position and infl icting costs associated with status loss. The potential for large fi tness gains associated with increases in status would have created selection pressures for specialized cognitive adaptations that lead to hierarchy ascension and other cognitive mechanisms to prevent large status falls. Because a greater number of mating opportunities enhances the reproductive success of men more than that of women, there should be greater status striving among men than among women. Research across the life span has found this to be the case, with men placing greater importance on coming out ahead and women focusing more on maintaining social harmony (Maccoby, 1990; Pratto, 1996; Whiting & Edwards, 1988) .
Confl ict over Material Resources
A second context of ancestrally recurrent confl ict was fi ghting over material resources, specifi cally resources that helped to solve recurrent adaptive problems. Such resources included territory, food, weapons, and tools. There also was confl ict to gain the favor of individuals who were the suppliers of material resources, examples of which include the confl ict between siblings for investment from their parents and elder kin (Parker, Royle, & Hartley, 2002) and confl ict between women for access to men with resources (Buss, Larsen, & Westen, 1996; Buss, Larsen, Westen, & Semmelroth, 1992) . In general, the scarcer and more valuable the resource in terms of its contribution to an individual's reproductive success, the greater the confl ict should be between individuals over access to the resource.
Confl ict over Mating Resources
Whereas the minimum obligatory parental investment for women is nine months, the minimum investment for men can be as little as a few moments. Because women's minimum investment in reproduction is greater, the costs of a poor mate choice are greater for women than for men (Trivers, 1972) . As a result, there is confl ict between the sexes about the timing of sexual activity. Because sex is less costly for men than for women, they desire sexual activity much earlier in a relationship than do women (Werner-Wilson, 1998) . Men also desire a greater number of sexual partners than do women (Schmitt, Shackelford, Duntley, Tooke, & Buss, 2001) and are more amenable to short-term, uncommitted sex (Buss, 2003a ). These differences in men's and women's sexual desires are a clear source of evolutionarily recurrent confl ict between the sexes. One hypothesized result of this confl ict is sexual harassment, a topic explored by Kingsley Browne in Chapter 5 of this volume. Another is the existence of female prostitution. In Chapter 7 of this volume, Catherine Salmon provides insight into the origins of this cross-culturally ubiquitous phenomenon.
There also is confl ict within each sex for access to members of the opposite sex. Women are biologically limited in the number of offspring they can have in their lifetime. In contrast, men are limited reproductively only by the number of female partners they can successfully impregnate. Given an equal sex ratio, men who impregnate more than one woman or who have more than one long-term partner at any time effectively deprive rivals of a potential mate. Human polygynous mating systems, in which males may have more than one mate at a time, lead to greater reproductive success for some men and zero reproductive success for others. Over evolutionary time, the greater reproductive variance among men selected for more extreme male strategies to acquire mates. Daly and Wilson (1988) argue that "risky strategies" such as the use of violence are one outcome of this unique selection pressure on men. Over evolutionary time, men who failed to take risks would have been at a disadvantage in competition for mates and, therefore, less likely to leave descendants. In Chapter 8 of this volume, Martin Lalumière reviews theoretical and empirical work on risk tolerance and risk avoidance from a life history perspective.
Confl ict and Kin Selection
Evolutionary researchers have documented that confl ict is usually tempered by genetic relatedness. Genetic relatives are less likely to experience confl ict over resources than are nonrelatives. Closer genetic relatives do not experience confl ict as often as or to the degree that more distant relatives do (see Buss, 2004, for a review argued to be the evolutionary product of kin selection. According to kin selection theory (Hamilton, 1963; Maynard Smith, 1964) , humans and other organisms have evolved to act more favorably toward their genetic relatives than toward nonrelatives. If genes that code for altruism exist in an individual, they also are likely to be present in the individual's genetic relatives. Natural selection would favor behaving altruistically toward genetic kin who can convert that investment into reproduction, which translates into the production of additional copies of shared genes. Daly and Wilson (1988) applied the logic of kin selection theory to family relationships. They hypothesized that genetic relatedness creates a special kind of family bond. Genetic relatives, they argue, should behave more altruistically toward one another than family members who are not genetically related, such as stepparents and stepchildren. To put it another way, stepfamily members should be in greater confl ict with each other than genetic family members. To test their hypothesis, Daly and Wilson secured homicide records from the United States and Canada. They used homicide as an assay of confl ict between family members. They discovered that children are between 40 and 100 times more likely to be murdered when they reside in a home in which a stepparent is present than when residing with two genetic parents. Adult children are also more likely to kill a stepparent than a genetic parent. Daly and Wilson propose that the greater confl ict between stepfamily members is produced by an activation failure of psychological mechanisms that generate closeness between genetic relatives. In Chapter 4 of this volume, Aaron Goetz and Todd Shackelford explore the confl icts between intimate partners that can lead to violence.
Specifi c Cost-Infl icting Strategies to Outcompete Rivals
Theft
One strategy of cost infl iction that may be used to gain an advantage in competition for resources is theft (see Cohen & Machalek, 1988) or otherwise cheating rivals out of their resources. A valuable weapon can be stolen and used against its owner. Valuable territory can be encroached upon and its vegetation, water, shelter, and wildlife exploited (Chagnon, 1983) . Mates can be poached from an existing relationship (Buss, 2000; Buss, 2003a; . Public knowledge that a person has been cheated or has had valuables stolen also can affect the individual's reputation. The person may be viewed by others as someone who is easy to exploit, perhaps increasing the likelihood that others will attempt to cheat or steal from the person in the future. An easily exploitable person will likely be less attractive to members of the other sex. In short, cheating and the theft of resources can be effective strategies of cost-infl iction for the gain of reproductively relevant resources, including material resources and status. The topic of theft is explored by Satoshi Kanazawa in Chapter 9 of this volume.
Vigilance and Violence in Romantic Relationships Buss and Shackelford (1997b) found that men and women engage in tactics that range from vigilance to violence to defend their relationships. Fueled by jealousy, an emotion absent from contexts of material-resource theft, men's tactics of defending against mate poachers were found to be different from women's. Men are more likely to conceal their partners, display resources, and resort to threats and violence, especially against rivals. Men also are more likely to use tactics of submission and selfabasement, groveling or promising their partner anything to get her to stay. Women are more likely to enhance their appearance and to induce jealousy in their partners, demonstrating their desirability by showing that they have other mating options available to them.
Rape
Rape, a topic explored in Chapter 6, is a strategy aimed directly at obtaining reproductive resources at a cost to the victim. A rapist may benefi t from the behavior by siring offspring that he may not have otherwise produced. Not only does rape infl ict terrible emotional (Block, 1990; Burgess & Holmstrom, 1974) and physical costs (Geist, 1988) on women, it also infl icts fi tness costs by bypassing female mate choice mechanisms (Buss, 2004) . Although scholars have concluded that there is not enough evidence to determine whether men have adaptations to rape (Buss, 2003a (Buss, , 2004 Symons, 1979) , ethnographies and historical records suggest that rape occurs cross-culturally and was recurrent over the deep time of our evolutionary history (Buss, 2003a) . The occurrence of rape would have created selection pressure for strategies to avoid and resist it.
Violence and Homicide
Unlike some other strategies of infl icting costs, violence and homicide represent more fl exible solutions to confl icts between individuals. Violence can be used to damage the status of a competitor or as an instrumental measure to facilitate theft. Homicide can free resources from the control of a rival and permanently eliminate cost-infl icting competitors.
Using violence to injure rivals can be an effective strategy to remove them from competition for a valuable resource. A healthy individual can compete more effectively than the rivals he injures. Competitors may be more likely to avoid or to drop out of competition with an individual who has injured them in the past. An individual who is capable of infl icting greater injuries to his competitors than they can infl ict on him may gain a reputation of being diffi cult to exploit. This reputation may protect an individual against violent confrontations and grant easier access to resources with less resistance from competitors. Daly and Wilson (1988) , among others (Chagnon, 1988; Ghiglieri, 1999) , have documented that violence and homicide can be outcomes of intraspecifi c competition. Competition for mates (Buss, 2000; Weekes-Shackelford, Shackelford, & Buss, 2003) , competition for status (Daly & Wilson, 1996; Shackelford, 2005) , and competition for resources (Daly & Wilson, 1988; Kruger & Nesse, 2004) have been documented to be sources of violent confl ict with the potential to lead to homicide. Even homicides that result from seemingly trivial altercations between two individuals who did not previously know one another can be understood through the lens of evolutionary psychology (Buss, 2005; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Ghiglieri, 1999 
Coevolution
From an evolutionary perspective, all crimes can be thought of as strategies that function to benefi t the criminal at the cost of the victim. Evolutionary theories of crime are fundamentally coevolutionary theories of adaptations that produce criminal behavior and counteradaptations to defend against being victimized (Buss & Duntley, 2006; Duntley, 2005) . Haldane (1932 Haldane ( , 1949a Haldane ( , 1949b was among the fi rst to recognize the importance of coevolutionary arms races in his discussion of the infl uence of infectious diseases on human evolutionary history. He pointed out that infectious pathogens possess adaptations that enable them to use human tissues to reproduce and that we have evolved counterstrategies to prevent our being invaded by pathogens. Antagonistic coevolutionary arms races are part of the evolutionary history of all species. They can occur between species, such as the lynx and the hare, or within species between competing adaptations in contexts of social confl ict. Such coevolutionary arms races have likely shaped a large number of complex adaptations. They can create massive selection pressures capable of producing quite rapid evolutionary change (see Altizer, Harvell, & Friedle, 2003; Phillips, Brown, & Shine, 2004) .
The Fitness Costs of Being Victimized
It is a truism that victims of crime incur fi tness costs. Individuals who are victimized are at a competitive disadvantage to those who are not. A victim of homicide provides an extreme example, the fundamental logic of which applies to all forms of victimization. A murder victim's death has a much larger impact on his or her inclusive fi tness than just the loss of the genes in the person's body. Death by homicide often has cascading deleterious effects on a victim's inclusive fi tness, including (a) the loss of future reproduction; (b) damage to existing children from lack of protection, investment, or the addition of stepparents; and (c) damage to the victim's extended kin group from diminished investment and a reputation for being exploitable.
A murder victim's fi tness losses can potentially be translated into a rival's fi tness gains. The residual reproductive and parenting value of the mate of a homicide victim may go to a rival, often at the expense of the victim's children with that mate, who may become stepchildren, a condition associated with an increased risk of abuse and homicide (Daly & Wilson, 1988) . The murder of a man or woman creates an opening in a social group's hierarchy into which a rival can ascend. The children of rivals who had two surviving genetic parents would thrive relative to the victim's children, who would be deprived of the investment, protection, and infl uence of two genetic parents.
Victim Defenses
The great costs resulting from being the victim of crime would have selected for adaptations to (a) avoid being victimized; (b) punish conspecifi cs who damage individuals' inclusive fi tness by infl icting costs on others, their genetic relatives, mates, or coalitional allies; and (c) eliminate or otherwise render impotent individuals who presented a persistent threat of infl icting costs in the future on the larger social group of which an individual, his kin, and his coalition are a part (e.g., psychopaths, hostile members of other groups). Infl icting costs on cost-infl icting rivals, including murdering them, is hypothesized to be part of an evolved strategy to avoid or stanch the inclusive fi tness costs of being victimized by another individual or group (Buss & Duntley, in press, 2006; Duntley, 2005; Duntley & Buss, 2005) .
To avoid being victimized, intended victims must be sensitive to cues indicative of situations in which someone else might benefi t from infl icting costs on them. Insight into the likelihood that one will be the victim of crime before the crime occurs requires that the majority of crimes be committed in predictable sets of circumstances. If particular crimes recurrently occurred in response to predictable sets of circumstances over our evolutionary history, selection would be for defense mechanisms capable of recognizing those circumstances and trying to change or avoid them. These and other aspects of victim adaptations are explored in Chapter 11. The evolution of such defense mechanisms, in turn, would have selected for strategies that could circumvent the evolved defenses. In this way, adaptations to avoid being victimized would have served as selection pressures for the refi nement of psychological adaptations for infl icting costs over evolutionary time. These new cost-infl icting adaptations would have selected for further refi nements in defense adaptations-cost-infl iction and defenses against victimization locked in a perpetual, antagonistic, coevolutionary arms race across generations, as illustrated in provide evidence that (a) the crime was likely a recurrent feature of ancestral environments, (b) the criminal strategy occurred in predictable patterns over our evolutionary history and, therefore, (c) there may be adaptations specifi cally for the crime. The greater the corresponding specifi city of design in the psychologies of crime and defenses against crime, the stronger the evidence that the two have had a coevolutionary relationship, and the greater the support for the existence of adaptations for criminal behavior. There are no perfect solutions to any adaptive problem. Every adaptation is a compromise between the numerous different adaptive problems an organism faces. At the same time an individual selection pressure operates to shape or refi ne an adaptation in a certain direction, other selection pressures push and pull on the evolutionary trajectory of its form and precise function, diverting it away from its optimal course for any single adaptive problem. It is unlikely that there would be enough stability in the selection pressures of a coevolutionary arms race, in combination with the other adaptive problems of survival and reproduction, for perfect adaptive solutions to evolve. Therefore, it is unlikely that adaptations that produce criminal behavior and adaptations to defend against being victimized will lead on every occasion to the outcomes for which they were designed. For selection to favor them, they need only lead to greater reproductive success than competing designs on average across the individuals in a population over evolutionary time.
Coevolutionary arms races may involve the competing interests of more than two individuals. This is particularly apparent in contexts involving mating (Buss, 2003b) . Coevolutionary arms races involving more than two individuals can occur, for example, when a woman who is married to one man becomes interested in another man. There is selection pressure on the woman to be faithful to her husband so as not to lose his investment or risk violent retaliation for her affair. There is also selection pressure on the woman to obtain better or different genes from those possessed by her husband or acquire additional investment from another man. Female adaptations to engage in infi delity in some contexts would select for male adaptations to stanch women's infidelities, especially when a man and woman are in a long-term mating relationship. One hypothesized male adaptation for dealing with infi delity is to infl ict costs on the woman-domestic violence, stalking, marital rape, or even murder.
Female adaptations that produce infi delity in certain contexts would select for adaptations in men who are not the woman's long-term mate to lure or aid women in being unfaithful. These male adaptations that promote female infi delity would, in turn, create selection pressure on men's long-term mating psychology for adaptations to prevent other men from poaching away their long-term partners, including the infl iction of costs on the mate poacher, the cheating mate, or both. Any adaptation that results from what Buss (2003b) refers to as "triadic coevolution" is shaped by selection pressures created by the adaptations of the two other individuals involved, as illustrated by Figure 1 .2. Newly evolved psychological mechanisms that benefi t any one individual in the triadic relationship impose new selection pressures on both of the other individuals. Adaptations in long-term males that lead to cost-infl iction as a strategy for dealing with a partner's infi delity, for example, would select for defense adaptations in both romantic partners and poachers. One possible evolved defense against being victimized is to anticipate victimization and preemptively infl ict costs on the victimizer. This would select for defense adaptations in victimizers. These defense adaptations are hypothesized to factor into the decision calculus responsible for motivating or inhibiting cost-infl icting patterns of behavior in men who discover that their partners have been unfaithful.
The Importance of Time and Opportunity
Time was likely an important and potentially powerful selection pressure on the psychology of criminal behavior and could have been so in at least two ways. First, the time available to solve a problem may increase or decrease the likelihood with which criminal behavior will be chosen as a solution. The amount of time that people have to react to different adaptive problems varies from situation to situation. Solutions to adaptive problems also vary in terms of how much time they require to be enacted effectively amount of time available to solve a given problem (Buss & Duntley, in press ). Estimates of the amount of time available would have been a source of input for making decisions about which adaptive solution should be employed. There were likely recurrent contexts of confl ict between people who had both a very large potential fi tness impact and a narrow time frame in which to enact a solution. Such situations could have selected for some of the risky, cost-infl icting strategies we label as crimes. Examples may include homicides that are committed in self-defense. A woman who is cornered in the kitchen by her abusive husband may reach instinctively for a knife to defend her life with-by ending his. In such situations, homicide may not be the most benefi cial possible solution to the problem, but it is the least costly of available alternatives. The presentation of rare opportunities that put cost-infl icting competitors at a signifi cant disadvantage in highly fi tness-relevant situations, if recurrent, could also have acted as selection pressures for the adoption of risky, criminal strategies (Buss & Duntley, in press ). For example, a man who walks in on his wife and a rival in the act of having sex is simultaneously assaulted with an extremely signifi cant adaptive problem and presented with a rare opportunity. The rival is naked and distracted, making him vulnerable to attack. The husband may never again have the rival at There also may have been recurrent adaptive problems involving social confl ict that required a greater amount of time to effectively enact a strategy involving criminal behaviors (Buss & Duntley, in press ). Cost-infl icting strategies that require the coordination of the efforts of multiple individuals require more time to deploy than strategies perpetrated by one person. Examples include contexts of coalitional aggression or tribal warfare. The raids of rival groups perpetrated by the Yanomamo in order to kidnap women and capture resources (Chagnon, 1988) could not be successful without coordination, which requires a larger window of time than many situations in which individuals commit single murders.
A second way that time could have been an important selection pressure for the evolution of adaptations that produce criminal behavior rests on the importance of responding to costly assaults from others in a timely fashion (Buss & Duntley, in press) . Most people are familiar with the proverb, "Revenge is a dish best served cold," which suggests that emotional detachment and planning are best for taking revenge. This may be true for the optimal planning of strategies of revenge. However, there are clear time limits on the effectiveness of strategies for seeking revenge. Waiting too long to avenge being wronged can decrease the effectiveness of vengeance in two ways: fi rst, by allowing more time for a reputation of being exploitable to grow, and second, by creating a larger window for exploitation to occur. Although revenge may be a dish that is best served cold, reputation may be an asset that is best defended by striking while the iron is hot. Infl icting costs on the individual who is the source of reputational damage, including murdering the person, is one effective strategy for the defense of reputation (Buss, 2005; Chagnon, 1988) . Murder eliminates the person's ability to infl ict costs in the future and clearly signals to other rivals the price they will pay for similar assaults.
As explained by Buss and Duntley (in press) , the timing of cost-infl icting, criminal strategies relative to other, complementary strategies is also likely to have been an important source of selection pressure on the function of mechanisms that produce criminal behavior. Adaptations that produce criminal behavior likely comprise a suite of mechanisms designed not only to infl ict costs but also to deal with the probable consequences of victimizing someone. Infl icting costs as the solution to a primary adaptive problem is likely to create secondary problems, such as retribution from victims and their genetic relatives. The recurrent costs of secondary problems would have created selection pressure for the evolution of secondary solutions to those problems. Some secondary solutions would be best employed after the secondary problems they created. For example, a criminal could take steps to (a) cover up the crime, (b) subsequently avoid victims and their genetic relatives, (c) threaten to infl ict additional costs on them, (d) actually infl ict costs on them if they attempt to retaliate, or (e) marshal a formidable coalition to help make the costs of avenging the victim's death too high to be adaptive. Other secondary solutions may be more appropriately adopted before the primary solution involving the infl iction of costs takes place. For example, an individual who may, in the future, adopt a strategy that includes cost-infl iction could try to impugn the status and reputation of the person he or she intends to victimize. An intended criminal might also attempt to drive wedges between would-be victims and the kin and coalitional allies who would pose the greatest threat of helping the victims seek revenge, thus eliminating or decreasing the magnitude of secondary problems that will likely result from infl icting costs on victims. These ideas are illustrated in Figure 1 .3. Interestingly, adaptations for infl icting costs could use information about the effectiveness of secondary solutions employed in anticipation of the secondary problems that cost-infl iction will create as a source of input for the cost-benefi t calculus that determines whether to pursue one particular criminal strategy over another, or do something else. In addition, if secondary solutions employed before a cost-infl icting strategy in particular contexts were recurrent over evolutionary time, selection should have operated on victims' defense adaptations to recognize the secondary solutions and motivate people to take action to prevent criminal behavior from occurring.
Implications of Adaptationist Research on the Psychology of Crime
There is great promise in applying the adaptationist approach to all cognitive and behavioral phenomena. Evolutionary theory provides a powerful set of tools for exploring the functions of psychological mechanisms. It suggests specifi c, novel hypotheses and provides a logical framework that opens and unites data sources not routinely utilized in psychological research (e.g., comparative, ethnographic, bioarcheological).
If it turns out that cognitive mechanisms that produce criminal behavior are biologically engrained in the human psyche, it does not mean that we should be more tolerant of crime because people "can't help themselves." We are not tolerant of a number of behaviors that humans may be biologically disposed to engage in, such as infi delity, spousal violence (Buss, 2000) , and violence toward stepchildren (Daly & Wilson, 1988) . In fact, there is substantial evidence to suggest that morality itself has evolutionary roots (see Chapter 12 of this volume). The existence of adaptations that produce crime also does not mean that crime is inevitable. Research on homicidal fantasies, for example, demonstrates that the vast majority of murder fantasies are not translated into homicidal reality (Kenrick & Sheets, 1993) . Jones (1997) argues that our system of laws is designed to act as a lever to move behavior in desired directions. By gaining a better understanding of how and why our psychology produces criminal behavior, we may be able to create more effective legal interventions to prevent crimes from occurring and more effective psychological treatments for offenders, likely offenders, and victims (see Chapter 14 of this volume). Even if the application of evolutionary logic to help understand criminal behavior turns out to be misguided, the research fi ndings it produces represent a valuable contribution to our understanding of crime.
In conclusion, evolutionary forensic psychology recognizes that crimes such as murder, nonlethal violence, rape, theft, and cheating are manifestations of evolutionarily recurrent confl icts between individuals. The cost-infl icting strategies that we recognize as crimes may have been favored by natural selection when they gave individuals an advantage in competition for resources (see Chapter 2 of this volume). Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection provides a powerful metatheoretical framework that has the potential to unify and energize forensic psychology just as it has the biological sciences (see Chapter 13 of this volume). In the future, we predict that evolutionary psychology will revolutionize the fi eld of forensic psychology, including our understanding of the psychology of crime, the cognition and behaviors of victims, jury selection, eye-witness testimony, judges' views of human nature, insanity, competency, and public policy. It is diffi cult to predict exactly how evolutionary psychology will affect the criminal justice system. The accumulation of research fi ndings grounded in evolutionary theory will refi ne and change the way we think about legal systems. New discoveries will also open new directions for inquiry and spawn additional research. Evolutionary forensic psychology represents the beginning of a revolution of thought and discovery that will bring us closer to the truth of who we are and what our laws are capable of doing.
